The issue of channel coordination is studied with the demand sensitive to price and order-to-delivery cycle. Combining with the Stackelberg Game Theory, the paper analyses the manufacturer and the retailer's optimal pricing and profits in decentralized decision model and centralized decision model.
Introduction
In recent years, the E-commerce and Internet information technology has been widely used and developed rapidly. On the basis of the traditional retail channel, many enterprises such as DELL, IBM, and Cisco have opened online direct channel, which constitute the dual channel supply chain network (e.g. AA Tsay et al. 1 ). In the build-to-order (BTO) production environment, the time sensitivity of demand to the order-to-delivery cycle has become more intense. Manufacturers continue to invest resources to shorten the order-to-delivery cycle (e.g. Heinonen et al. 2 ). Many scholars have made some achievements in the research of dual-channel supply chain, and the time sensitivity has become a hot research topic. Early in 1988, Stalk 3 point out that the time has become a strategic support strength of the enterprise competitive power, the rapid response to customer demand brings more powerful competitive advantage for enterprises. Bibo and Joseph 4 study the decision problem of inventory and lead time in the demand sensitive to price and sales lead time, and provide the model and solving method to obtain the optimal pricing and lead time. Hua et al. 5 study the effect of lead time on pricing behaviour of dual-channel supply chain members, and point out that the lead time can influence the pricing strategy and the profits of manufacturers and retailers. Zhu and Qi 6 study the pricing strategy of dual-channel supply chain in two kinds of situations: certainty and uncertainty of consumers' sensitivity to time. Shi et al. 7 discuss the coordination of dual-channel supply chain with different coordination contracts, and discuss the influence of the change of lead time on the decision variables. Cun and Xu 8 study the relationship between pricing and delivery time in two cases: centralized decision-making and decentralized decision-making, and point out the existence of optimal distribution time strategy. Shao 9, 10 , Ma 11 and Gao 12 also analyse the decision problem of the two-echelon BTO supply chain when demand is sensitive to price and time.
From the above literature, we can see that the research mainly focuses on the sensitivity of demand to time, the enterprise investment cost in improving the time factor is not fully considered yet. Moori et al. 13 and Roberts 14 point out that the promotion of logistics capability and business process reengineering (BPR) have a positive impact to shorten the order-to-delivery cycle. But the cost will also affect the channel profit. Therefore, how to coordinate the dual-channel supply chain and reasonably determine the product price of each channel are problems with practical and theoretical significance.
The basic model
Consider the two-echelon dual-channel supply chain consisting of a single BTO manufacturer and a single retailer, which manufacturer and retailer sell homogeneous products. The manufacturer sells the product to consumers through traditional retail channel and online direct channel, the retailer sells the product to consumers only through traditional retail channel. We denote the online direct channel and the tradition retail channel as channel 1 and 2, respectively, i.e. 1, 2 i = .
For convenience, we use the following notation ( 1, 2 i = ) throughout the paper:
c the marginal production cost of manufacture, 0 c > ; t the order-to-delivery cycle of dual-channel supply chain, 0 t > ; w the unit wholesale price announced by manufacturer, w c ≥ ;
m the sensitivity of demand to order-to-delivery cycle, termed as the time sensitivity, 0
We consider the cost of the manufacturer to shorten the order-to-delivery cycle as , which includes the investment cost for logistics, business process, information system, order management, and so on (e.g. S Cui et al.
15
). The greater the cost of enterprise investment, the corresponding order-to-delivery cycle will be shorter, is a decreasing function of
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order-to-delivery cycle, i.e.
, where ( ) is the maximum investment cost of the manufacturer, ( ) is the time elasticity of the cost . The investment cost of the manufacturer is always non-negative, i.e. , so the order-to-delivery cycle t meet the condition . In the whole supply chain, we assume that all information is public information, supply chain members are risk neutral and fully rational, and other variables in the model are non-negative. The product demand is given by the following.
Where a is the total market demand for the product when the product price ( ) We assume that the two kinds of distribution channels have the same order-to-delivery cycle, and the sensitivity coefficient of each channel product demand to the order-to-delivery cycle is the same.
Pricing and profit analysis of dual-channel supply chain

The decentralized decision (DD) model
The manufacturer and retailer can form two kinds of decision-making models, namely centralized decision (CD) and decentralized decision (DD).In the decentralized decision (DD) model, the manufacturer will choose Stackelberg game and act as the game leader, and the retailer will act as the game follower. The manufacturer alone bear all the investment cost which used to reduce order delivery cycle, so the retailer can free riding in the dual-channel supply chain. The profit function of the manufacturer and the retailer can be respectively written as
And the total profit function of dual-channel supply chain in the DD model is
Noticed that the second derivative of decision variables on the retailer's profit is 
The manufacturer can make decisions based on the retailer's response function. Substituting Eq. (6) into Eq. (3), we obtain the Hessian matrix of the manufacturer's profit function as follows:
As mentioned above, the parameters i k and l meet the conditions 0 
Substituting Eqs. (8) and (9) into Eq. (6), we obtain the product price of the retailer as follows ( 
From Eqs. (8) - (10), we can get the profit of the manufacturer and the retailer as follows ( 
The centralized decision (CD) model
In the centralized decision (CD) model, the manufacturer and the retailer become a unified decision-making body, they will make decision simultaneously to maximize the total profit of dual-channel supply chain. The total profit function of dual-channel supply chain is
The Hessian matrix of the total profit function is 
So the total profit of dual-channel supply chain in the CD model is
By comparing the total profit of dual-channel supply chain in the DD model and the CD model, we can obtain that ( ) 
It is obvious that 0 CD DD p p − > , this shows that under the decentralized decision-making model, the overall income level of the dual-channel supply chain is lower, and the overall optimization is not achieved. So the manufacturer and the retailer can increase their profits, improve the efficiency of the dual-channel supply chain, and achieve the Pareto improvement through channel coordination.
Coordination decision model with wholesale price discount contract
From the above analysis, we show that the manufacturer and the retailer in the dual-channel supply chain can achieve the maximum profit in the decentralized decision model, and the total profit of the supply chain is obviously lower than that under the centralized decision model. We design the wholesale price discount contract ( ) , the retailer's product price is ( )
The coordination of the dual-channel supply chain requires that the optimal pricing decisions under coordination decision model with coordination contracts are consistent with the optimal pricing decisions in the centralized decision model, which means
In order to ensure the effective implementation of the coordination contract, the optimal product price of the manufacturer in the online direct channel is not determined by 
To make the dual-channel supply chain members accept the coordination contract, in addition to meet the above condition Eq. (21), it must meet that the benefits of the members after the coordination is not less than the benefits before the coordination, which means To sum up, in a given order-to-delivery cycle t , the decision variables of the coordination contract meet ( )
dual-channel supply chain will reduce when the order-to-delivery cycle increases through a numerical example analysis, and the time sensitivity of demand has the same effect. The results have verified the effectiveness of the designed coordination contract.
